international authority. Without a international authority. Without a recognized legitimate international authority, he declares, future humanitarian wars will be conducted unilaterally or by a coalition.
Another chapter describes the intent of area bombing campaigns as either to target the "enemy's capability to conduct military operations" or to "terrorize civilian populations and demoralize enemy citizens." While today it is not politically correct to target civilians deliberately, the author believes any targeting of the enemy's infrastructure could have a disproportionately negative effect on innocent civilians. The consequences of bombing now-the loss of clean water, heat, medical care, and food-would surely be death later. In addition, Cook states, that new precision targeting may tempt political leaders to use force early, instead of as a last resort.
The short, seven-page chapter on "Resisting Global Terrorism" briefly describes the challenges of applying the just-war framework to terrorism. Since al-Qa'ida is not a sovereign state and war is waged only against states, does the United States have the legitimate authority to curb terrorist organizations throughout the world? Is there a reasonable hope of success? Cook suggests that the former model of state sovereignty for the just-war framework must be adapted when dealing with terrorism, because terrorism is not necessarily a threat to a single state but to our civilization's world order. I would have liked Cook to expand his thoughts on modifications to the just-war framework for terrorism.
What moral direction should the United States take now that it is the sole remaining superpower? What is the proper role of professional military advice from an ethical and practical viewpoint? Why is force protection so imperative in humanitarian operations? Is the desire for human rights and democratic governments universally shared? Can we assume that the trend towards globalization will make it "irrational for large-scale interstate warfare"? These are a few of the thought-provoking questions that are discussed in this book.
Of the nine chapters, eight have been previously published. This may account for the lack of smooth flow among the numerous themes. Those interested in just-war theory will find this book an interesting read, but in our post-9/11 environment, this extensive treatment of "humanitarian war" has lost some of its post-Kosovo luster. Solving the War Puzzle may be the most insightful and important examination of the causes of war since Clausewitz published On War in 1832. This slim volume, precisely written, superbly researched, and elegantly presented, carefully evaluates, integrates, and synthesizes the multiple elements the confluence of which results in armed conflict. This presentation is then used as a basis for choosing reasonable indices for the deterrence of interstate violence.
The broader international system is reviewed in terms of the government structures involved, the incentives presented to decision makers, and an examination of whether these structures In concluding that the best theory of war avoidance will use the "full human arsenal of insights against war," Moore carefully identifies the entire quiver of measures available to decision makers to achieve security. These include but are not limited to: diplomacy, the existence of unequal power between adversaries, the willingness to precommit forces to a troubled area, the existence of arms control agreements, and mutual participation in international organizations. Similarly, Moore carefully analyzes those factors that influence the leadership elite to employ the military instrument-the absence of democracy, the absence of effective deterrence, and most importantly, the synergy of an absence of both.
The "incentive theory" is further tested in its application to instances of terrorist violence, specifically to the U.S. response to the 9/11 attack by al-Qa'ida, and finally, to the 2003 war with Iraq.
Arguing that assessing and influencing the incentives of the decision elite who run terror networks may be even more effective than terror, Moore suggests that extremists will no longer choose to pursue it. Arguing that the incentive theory fits the Afghan War "like a glove," Moore also posits that had Saddam Hussein focused more clearly on the incentives affecting President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, he would have understood that his only opportunity to avoid war was a highly visible effort to achieve full compliance with Security Council resolutions.
In assessing the way forward, the author urges the positive consequences for foreign policy of a paradigm rooted in the importance of internal and external incentives. As long as incentives within certain nations do not properly operate to control these scourges, incentives must be supplied externally. Moore argues that by considering the operation of collective security in deterrence terms, created through effective incentives, an essential element of foreign policy can be both preserved and enhanced. Based on an October 2001 conference at the National Defense University, but published with revised papers two years later, this collection of seemingly miscellaneous essays all too often either misses the mark completely or treats only very lightly a long list of potential U.S.-Chinese problems.
After an introduction, the book is divided into six sections examining
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